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Probably the best solution of the problem is found in the "impossible or
unreasonable" clause in the act.20 It would not be impossible to reinstate the
veteran defendants, but it would appear to be unreasonable to require their reinstatement when the employer's operations have been so reduced that senior
employees would have to be displaced. Industrial and labor practices which
have been built up over many years would be disrupted and a solution of
employment problems according to procedures which have been established in
industry would no longer be possible. A policy bound to arouse antagonism
within the plant would be substituted and the result would be harmful to both
labor and management.2' f veterans are given seniority out of proportion to
that which they would have possessed had they not gone into military service,
older workers with perhaps greater responsibilities would be deprived of a status
on which they have come to rely; among those displaced may be veterans of the
first World War.- It is conceivable that some employers might have to operate
almost entirely with relatively unskilled personnel. Those who have served their
country in the armed forces are entitled to compensating benefits, but these
should not be at the expense of a particular class.23

Taxation-Constitutionality of Community-Property Estate Tax Amendments-[United States].-The plaintiffs, sole beneficiaries under the will of a
Louisiana testator, filed a federal estate tax return reporting only one-half the
value of the community property and one-half the proceeds of insurance policies
on the decedent's life, premiums for which had been paid out of community
funds. The decedent had been the sole contributor to the community fund.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue under the authority of the 1942 community-property estate tax amendments' to the Revenue Code levied a deficiency assessment, including in the gross estate the entire value of the community property and the entire proceeds from the insurance policies. The
0 An employer must restore a qualified person to "such position or to a position of like
seniority, status, and pay unless the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it
impossible or unreasonable to do so." 54 Stat. 89o (x94o), as amended 58 Stat. 798 ('944),
50 U.S.C.A. (Appendix) § 3o8 (b) (B) (Supp., 1945). The constitutionality of this section of
the act was upheld in Hall v. Union Light, Heat and Power Co., 53 F. Supp. 817 (Ky.,
1944). See also Kay v. General Cable Corp., x44 F. 2d 653 (C.C.A. 3 d, '944), with regard to
interpretation of this provision.
. In the instant case one of the veterans was attempting to displace his former foreman.

- The American Veterans of World War 11 have contended that this would mean robbing
Peter to pay Paul. Veterans Body's "No" to Superseniority, I5 Lab. Rel. Rep. i98, i99 ('944).
23 Olin Industries, Inc. v. Barnett, 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv.
62,935 at p. 68,593 (D.C. Ill.,
1946); Droste v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv. 62,947 at p. 68,631 (D.C.
Mich., 1946) (quoting General Bradiey, Administrator of Veterans' Affairs); In re Dow Chemical Co., I7 Lab. Rel. Rep. 646 (1946).
x56 Stat. 941 (1942), 26 U.S.C.A. § 8xi (e) (2) (Supp., 1945); 26 U.S.C.A. § 8ii (g) (4)
(Supp., 1945).
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plaintiffs brought an action to recover the deficiency payment. The federal district court held that the amendments violated the due process requirements of
the Fifth Amendment. 2 On appeal to the Supreme Court, held, the communityproperty estate tax amendments to the Revenue Code do not violate the constitutional uniformity and due process requirements. Control of the entire
marital community having been exercised exclusively by the husband during
his lifetime, the entire estate is subject to taxation upon his death. Judgment
3
reversed. Fernandez v. Wiener.
Writers have long recognized that discrimination exists in favor of community-property states.4 This discrimination had its origin in the application
of tax laws written by lawyers schooled in traditional common-law property
doctrines to the anomolous situation found in the community-property states.
The perpetuation of this discrimination is the result of the combination of a
Supreme Court decision which was contrary to a general trend toward the taxation of beneficial ownership,s general public apathy, and the self interest of the
community-property states, which have been unwilling to relinquish their
subsidy without a fight.
The discrimination was first established in the income tax field by Poe v.
Seaborn6 which sanctioned the filing of separate returns by couples in community-property states, each reporting one-half the community income. A
similar analysis was applied in the levying of estate taxes. 7 The estate-tax
2

Wiener v. Fernandez, 6o F. Supp. 169 (La., 1945).

366 Sup. Ct. 178 (1945), rehearing den., 66 Sup. Ct. 52S (1946). This estate had been in
previous litigation on the state inheritance-tax assessment. Louisiana had levied in accordance
with the provisions of the federal Revenue Act in order to take advantage of the credit allowance. The Louisiana Supreme Court held the community-property estate-tax amendments unconstitutional, Succession of Wiener, 2o3 La. 65o, 14 So. 2d 475 (1943). Appeal to the United
States Supreme Court was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S.
253 (1944).
4
Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation § 1.09 (1942); 3 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 19.01 (942); Altman, The Community Property Amendment to the Estate
Tax Law, 21 Taxes 643 (1943); Altman, Community Property in Peril, i9 Taxes 262 (1941);
Ray, Proposed Changes in Federal Taxation of Community Property, 3o Calif. L. Rev. 397,
527 (1942); Paul, The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937, SUniv. Chi. L. Rev. 41, 84-85

(i937).

s Poe v. Seaborn,
6 282

U.S.

101

282 U.S. 101 (1930).
(i93o). The Seaborn case, which determined the income-tax rule as applied

to Washington community property, was the first of four decisions handed down by the
Court on the same day on the same question. The other cases were: Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S.
iu8 (i93o) (Arizona); Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930) (Texas); Bender v. Pfaff, 282
U.S. 127 (I930) (Louisiana). On the basis of these decisions the Treasury Department applied
the same rule to Idaho, Nevada, and New Mexico. Estimates as to the subsidy thus created
have varied from $2o,ooo,ooo to $35o,ooo,ooo annually. See Paul, The Background of the
Revenue Act of 1937, S Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 41, 84 (I937) and the statement of Rep. Voorhis of

California, 88 Cong. Rec. 6344 (1942).
7 The splitting of the community estate upon the death of either spouse has been implicitly approved by the courts, although the matter has never been expressly considered. See
United States v. Goodyear, 99 F. 2d 523 (C.C.A. 9th, 1938).
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amendments upheld by the Court in the instant case were designed to remove
the estate-tax discrimination. The amendments provided that the gross estate
of the decedent in community-property states would include all the community
property less that part which was the earnings or property, or had been derived
from the earnings or property, of the surviving spouse, except that in no case
could the decedent's estate be less than that part which was subject to the
decedent's power of testamentary disposition.8 The constitutional objections
to these amendments are similar to those which were considered by the Supreme
Court when the common-law joint-interest tax avoidance devices were litigated. 9 The objections have been discussed at length in legal literature, in
relation to both estate-tax and income-tax problems.I0 The weight of authority is that the constitutional problem is readily surmounted.
-However, may writers now attack the estate-tax amendment on the ground
that it discriminates against community property with as much vigor as they
attack the income-tax law because it discriminates in favor of community
property? There may be many objections to estate taxes per se,"r but if they are
to prevail they should impose equal burdens upon persons similarly situated.
The splitting of the estate upon the death of either spouse in the communityproperty states resulted in the same effectual tax avoidance at death as the
separate income-tax return afforded during life. The amendment attempts to
establish the same basis of estate determination as prevails in the common-law
states. Although the Court in the instant case has supported the result on a
control theory, it is apparent that the criterion established by the amendment
is contribution. Control and contribution may be statistically synonomous, yet
8 "The amendment thus makes due provision for the exclusion from the gross estate of that
portion of the community property which is economically attributable to the survivor, subject, however, to the provision that in no case shall the value of the property included in the
gross estate of the decedent be less than the value of such decedent's power of testamentary
disposition. Property 'derived originally from' compensation or from separate property of the
surviving spouse includes (i) property acquired in exchange for property received as compensation or in exchange for separate property, (2) community income yielded by such property and
property acquired with such income, and (3) property which may be traced back to property
received as compensation, separate property, income from property received as compensation,
or income from separate property. The statute establishes a uniform Federal rule for apportioning the respective contribution of the spouses regardless of varying local rules of apportionment. State presumptions are therefore not operative against the Commissioner." H. Rep.
2333, 77 Cong. 2d sess. i6o (1942); cf. S. Rep. 1631, 77 Cong. 2d sess. 231 (1942).
Opponents of the amendments claim that in the majority of cases it is "wholly impossible" to trace the separate property or earnings. Jackson, New Federal Estate and Gift
Taxes on Community Property, 2r Taxes 535 (x943). The burden is no greater than that placed
on surviving joint tenants or tenants by the entireties to show their actual contribdtion, so as
to exclude that portion from the decedent's gross estate.
9United States v. Jacobs, 3o6 U.S. 363 (I939); Tylerv. UnitedStates, 2Si U.S. 497 (1930).

lo Ray, op. cit. supra, note 4, at 425; Jackson, Taxation of Community Property; The
Wiener Case, 18 Tul. L. Rev. 525, 546 (1944); Altman, The Community Property Amendment
to the Estate Tax Law, 21 Taxes 643 (i943).
11See i Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation § 1.05 (1942).
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they are analytically separable. The amendment expressly permits that portion
of the community property which the surviving spouse contributed to be deducted from the gross estate of the decedent, whether or not the survivor was
the controller. It is the qualification to the amendment-that the deduction
based on contribution by the surviving spouse cannot reduce the decedent's
estate below that share which was subject to the decedent's power of testamentary disposition-which leads opponents of the amendment to claim that
there is now discrimination against the community-property states. It is submitted that this power of testamentary disposition which the non-contributing,
predeceasing spouse has is the primary distinction between community-property and common-law marital arrangements. The instant case points up the
significance of this distinction. The husband has been the breadwinner; Mrs.
Wiener has contributed no more to the estate and has no more control-2 over
the community property than does any housewife in any non-communityproperty state. Upon the death of Mr. Wiener the whole community estate is
subject to tax under the 1942 amendments since the entire contribution has
been made by Mr. Wiener. Had there been any contribution by Mrs. Wiener
such portion could have been deducted from Mr. Wiener's gross estate, despite
the lack of control on the part of Mrs. Wiener. An identical situation arises in
any of the forty common-law states upon the predecease of the contributing
spouse. In Louisiana one-half the community property goes to Mrs. Wiener.3 In
the common-law states the surviving wife gets dower or one of the substitutes
variously provided. Assume, on the other hand, that Mrs. Wiener had predeceased Mr. Wiener. Under the law of Louisiana one-half the community property would be subject to her power of testamentary disposition despite the fact
that Mr. Wiener had contributed and controlled all of the estate. An estate tax
would be applicable to that portion since such is Mrs. Wiener's estate at that
time;14 it had been taken from the actual contributor, Mr. Wiener, by operation
of state law.' s A comparable tax cannot be levied in common-law states because
12 "The husband is the head and master of the partnership or community of gains; he administers its effects, disposes of the revenues which they produce, and may alienate them by
an onerous title, without the consent and permission of his wife." La. Civ. Code Ann. (Dart,
'945) art. 2404.
X3La. Civ. Code Ann. (Dart, 1945) art. 24o6.

24The Court, in discussing the effect of the predecease of the wife, apparently assumes that
the gross estate will include all the community property, not one-half plus any over one-half
which the wife has contributed. The Court then has to argue in terms of control, to justify
the tax burden which the surviving husband would unreasonably bear under this premise.
The amendment does not justify this assumption by the Court. The gross estate of the decedent should not include any property contributed by the surviving spouse which is not
subject to the decedents power of testamentary disposition.
isAttack has been made on the estate-tax amendments on the ground that when the husband dies first, a control theory is utilized, while when the wife dies first, community rules
are accepted. Thus the tax is said to be dependent on the "sheer accident of who happens to
die first." Jackson, New Federal Estate and Gift Taxes on Community Property, 21 Taxes
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the predeceasing, non-contributing spouse can pass nothing, either by will or
intestate succession.
The instant case is particularly significant in that it appears to forecast the
demise of the income-tax subsidy of the community-property states. Poe v.
Seaborn, 6 the rallying point of community-property proponents, established the
income-tax subsidy for community-property states by holding that under the
income-tax law which taxed income "of" the individual each spouse could report
one-half the total income of the community, thereby reducing the tax liability
below that which it would be should the husband, the actual earner of the income, report the whole sum. The decision was founded on the communityproperty concept that with certain exceptions each spouse has an immediate,
vested half-interest in income and property acquired after marriage. It was upon
this decision that the splitting of the community estate upon the death of either
spouse was supported, prior to the estate-tax amendments. 7 The Seaborn case
has never rested on too solid a foundation. Five years earlier Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Court in United States v. Robbins,'8 frustrated the
attempt of a California couple to split their community income. Although the
Robbins decision was based on the premise that under California law the wife
had only an expectancy, Mr. Justice Holmes said that even if her interest was
immediately vested, it was all taxable to the husband, since he exercised control
over it. However, when the Seaborn case was before the Court the control theory
was abandoned. California, in order to take advantage of the Seaborn decision,
amended its community-property laws to provide that each spouse attained an
immediate vested interest.'9 When this device was tested in UnitedStates v.
Malcolm,' ° the Court followed the Seaborn case ignoring the strong dictum of the
Robbins case.
These community-property income-tax cases represented the sole departure
from the control theory in the taxation of the income of married people. The
control theory was employed to prevent married couples from lessening their
tax liability through assignment-l and revocable trust2 2 devices.
It is apparent that the present Court has accepted "control" as the determining factor in the taxation of family interests. In Helvering v. Clifford 3 it was
held that the income from a revocable trust was the income of the grantor
rather than that of his wife, who was the beneficiary. Subsequent to the Wiener
535, 536 (i943). But it is submitted that the situation is substantially different when the wife
dies first. By her death she divests her husband of control of one-half the community,
and thus creates an estate which is subject to taxation.
16 282 U.S. io (193o).
'7Note

7, supra.

18269 U.S. 315

(1925).

19Cal. Civ. Code (Deering,
2o 282 U.S. 792 (1931).

Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. i (i93o).
- Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (I93o),

21

1941) § 16ia.

23 .o9

U.S. 33 (J940).
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case the Court held that the entire income from a family partnership was the income of the husband, where he had made the original contribution of funds and
had exercised exclusive control.24 The anomalous position of the Seaborncase was
magnified even further in Com'r of Internal Revenue v. Harmon.2s In that case
the Court refused to extend the Seaborn subsidy to an Oklahoma couple who
had elected to come under Oklahoma's optional community-property law, on
the ground that such community property was of a consensual rather than legal
nature.' The refusal to extend the Seaborn case to cover the Harmon case, if
extension it would have been, manifests the Court's dissatisfaction with the
7

Seaborn case.2

The foundation of the Seaborn case has been completely undermined by the
application of control-theory notions to community-property arrangements in
the instant case. It appears that the Court is now prepared to take the step
which Congress has refused to take to alleviate the income-tax inequalities
8
between the common-law and community-property states.2
'4 Com'r of Internal Revenue v. Tower, 66 Sup. Ct. 532 (1946); Lusthaus v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, 66 Sup. Ct. 539 (x946). The device of giving property to the wife (upon which
a federal gift tax had been paid) and then having her contribute that property to the partnership as her share did not establish a partnership for taxation purposes. Mr. Justice Reed and
the Chief Justice dissented in both cases, arguing that the gift was a valid gift and that the
income should be taxable to the donee, as the donee had control of her share of the partnership
assets.
2s323 U.S. 44 (1944).
26 In Oklahoma the husband and wife came under the community-property provisions by
filing a written instrument with the Secretary of State. In Louisiana a couple can agree that
community property shall not exist between them. Is this legal or consensual?
'7 Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in the Harmon case, argued that if the income-tax subsidy is to be allowed, it should have been allowed in that case, or, "If we are not to apply it
equally to all [community-property] states, we should be rid of it." 323 U.S. 44, 57 (1944),8 Suggested legislation has been of two types, compulsory joint returns or a direct attack
on the community-property states by requiring the tax to be paid by the actual earner. For a
legislative history of these attempts see Ray, op. cit. supra, note 4, at 4o8.
The continual use of a control theory by the Court goes beyond calling for the overthrow
of the Seaborn doctrine and suggests something more like compulsory joint returns. This suspicion gains credence from the references which Mr. Justice Douglas has made to the economic
unity of the family in his opinion in the Clifford case (note 23, supra), in his dissent in the
Harmon case (note 27, supra), and in his concurring opinion in the instant case, 66 Sup. Ct.
178, 190 (i945). Mr. Justice Black, who joined in the Harmon dissent and in the concurring
opinion in the instant case, made similar references in the majority opinion in the family partnership cases (note 24, supra). The rationale of this attitude is that the family lives as a unit,
no matter what proportion of the income is contributed by either spouse-hence tax liability
should be a function of the total income of the family unit.
The dissent of Mr. Justice Reed in the family-partnership cases (note 24, supra) indicates
a reluctance on the part of certain members of the Court to pursue this line of reasoning too far.
The family partnerships which were created in those cases by contributions by the wife of
funds received as a gift from the husband bear striking resemblance to the community-property
system. Yet Mr. Chief Justice Stone, who delivered the unanimous decision in the instant
case, joined the dissenting opinion in the family partnership cases.
The Court is, of course, powerless to require compulsory joint returns. It can, however,
overthrow the Seaborn case, should the opportunity be presented.

